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Introduction
Why should the European Central Bank (ECB) care about regional differences in inflation rates across the Eurozone? In general, the ECB focuses on average economic conditions in the Eurozone and attempts to ignore national idiosyncrasies as much as possible. This focus seems to fall within the parameters of its mandate to maintain price stability in the Eurozone as a whole. It is also in line with the absence of instruments to fine-tune monetary policy to cyclical circumstances in individual EMU countries. However, in a recent paper the ECB (2003) acknowledges that its monetary policy must consider the size, persistence and determinants of differences in inflation rates. 1 The ECB is targeting a European-wide consumer price index, yet nobody in the monetary union consumes according to this price index. The recent inflation experience in the Eurozone underpins the ECB's concern. After the introduction of the Euro, the cross-country variation in the inflation rates of Member States has not fallen quickly. In the run-up to EMU all countries with the exception of Greece fulfilled the inflation criterion of the Maastricht Treaty. However, in each year since 1999, three or more countries have failed to fulfil the Maastricht criterion.
In an integrated market such as the Euro Area, inflation differentials across countries arise as an integral part of catching up and adjustment mechanisms to shocks.
Policymakers' main concern is that inflation differentials are more than just temporary deviations from the Eurozone average. Consequently, in EMU monetary policy has real effects because monetary policy affects the real interest rate which in 1 The ECB (2003, p. 6) writes "[...] the ECB's monetary policy strategy attributes a secondary role to inflation differentials when calibrating the safety margin for admissible inflation in the Euro Area".
turn affects aggregate spending decisions. With a uniform nominal interest rate, the domestic real interest rates will be lower in high inflation regions, discouraging savings and stimulating consumption and investment. In comparison to a monetary policy that is conducted nationally via a Taylor-type interest rate rule, within a monetary union the real interest rate channel no longer acts as a brake on the cycle but instead may accelerate regional economic developments. This effect may be further amplified by wealth effects, as low real interest rates may inflate share and real estate prices. The sole remaining countervailing force is the appreciation of the real exchange rate. However, the elimination of nominal exchange rates within the union reduces the speed with which this variable adjusts. Adjustment mechanisms of real appreciation or depreciation likely operate only at a slow pace.
Empirical evidence on the size and persistence of inflation differentials is provided by the use of actual instead of expected inflation rates will exaggerate cross-country differences. The ECB argues that economic agents should be able to foresee the consequences of regional inflation differentials for a region's competitive position and understand the implications of the ECB's price stability objective. Economic agents should therefore conclude that, in the medium to long run, inflation divergences cannot last. In theory, they will adjust their inflation expectations accordingly. For macroeconomic adjustment the relevant interest rates are the ex ante real rates, not the ex post real rates. Using Consensus inflation forecasts, the ECB (2004) shows that the dispersion in ex ante real rates is lower than the dispersion in ex post real rates. Table   1 reproduces the main ECB findings. The dispersion of ex ante rates is 30-35% lower for short-term rates and almost 60% lower for long-term rates. This paper adds the following contributions to the debate. Using data from the European Commission's Consumer Survey we attempt to corroborate the ECB findings that cross-country differences in expected inflation rates (used to calculate ex ante real rates) are smaller than cross-country differences in actual inflation rates (used to calculate ex post real rates). An advantage of the use of the Consumer Survey is that it provides a direct measure of consumers' inflation expectations. A limitation is that it confines the analysis to short-term (one-year ahead) inflation expectations.
Nevertheless, this allows a comparison with the short-term Consensus inflation forecasts in Table 1 . In contrast to the Consensus Forecasts that summarize the views of a limited number of professional economists, the Consumer Survey is based on a large-scale survey among consumers. We hypothesize that professional economists may be better placed to deduct the theoretical implications of monetary union for the convergence in inflation rates than ordinary consumers. The Consensus data might therefore demonstrate more convergence in inflationary expectations than actually exists among the public (according to the Consumer Survey data). A low convergence of inflation expectations among the public might subsequently reinforce inflation persistence through its effect on the wage-and price-setting process. After deriving quantitative estimates of expected inflation from the qualitative survey data using the so-called probability approach, we estimate a model to test for beta-convergence in consumers' inflation expectations. In addition to our analysis of inflation
expectations, we document and analyze the development in inflation uncertainty in EMU Member States before and after the introduction of the Euro.
The outline of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the Consumer Survey data and the methodology used to extract quantitative inflation expectations from these data. Section 3 reports the empirical findings. Using the Consumer Survey data, we are unable to detect a significantly stronger convergence in inflation expectations than the convergence in actual inflation rates. Drawing from the empirical findings there thus seems to be no substantial evidence that consumers use EMU to anchor their inflation expectations to the price stability objective of the ECB. Instead, the formation of inflation expectations seems to depend mainly on past national inflation rates. We also confirm the generally accepted link between the inflation rate and inflation uncertainty. Moreover, since 1999 an interesting new link has arisen between country size and inflation uncertainty. Section 4 summarizes and concludes our findings on inflation expectations and inflation uncertainty.
Data and methodology
Our data on inflation expectations consists of the European Commission's Consumer categories. For Question (6), the balance is calculated as follows:
where S i refers to the sample proportion for the corresponding response category.
A sizable amount of literature has developed on the extraction of quantitative estimates of expected inflation from qualitative survey data using the so-called probability approach. Early contributions are by Carlson and Parkin (1975) and Batchelor and Orr (1988 ( )
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where the i t Z 's are defined as follows: price index over the past twelve months, as monthly inflation data are published on a timely basis in all Eurozone countries.
Empirical findings
This section reports our empirical findings. In subsection 3.1 we examine the convergence in expected inflation in the Eurozone and its consequences for ex ante real interest rates. Subsection 3.2 provides evidence of inflation uncertainty within members of the Eurozone and its relationship with inflation and country size.
Convergence in inflation expectations
Prior to reviewing the constructed quantitative estimates of inflationary expectations, The balance data by themselves, however, do not provide sufficient evidence of lack of convergence. It is possible that countries with low past inflation rates have high balance scores (indicating a higher expected inflation) and conversely, resulting in a convergence of inflation expectations, although the data would still show a high level of dispersion across the balance scores. We therefore need to look at the quantitative estimates of expected inflation derived using the methodology outlined in the previous section. 1 9 8 7 . 0 6 1 9 8 8 . 0 6 1 9 8 9 . 0 6 1 9 9 0 . 0 6 1 9 9 1 . 0 6 1 9 9 2 . 0 6 1 9 9 3 . 0 6 1 9 9 4 . 0 6 1 9 9 5 . 0 6 1 9 9 6 . 0 6 1 9 9 7 . 0 6 1 9 9 8 . 0 6 1 9 9 9 . 0 6 2 0 0 0 . 0 6 2 0 0 1 . 0 6 2 0 0 2 . 0 6 2 0 0 3 . 0 6 2 0 0 4 . 0 6
Standard deviation Balance, 9 EU members Standard deviation Balance, 11 EU members F having a more recent experience of high (expected) inflation, Greece also joined EMU at a later stage (in 2001) than the other European countries. In our view, this different path towards EMU warrants reporting our results both including and excluding Greece. 
where Eπ t,i denotes expected inflation at time t in country i and ∆ is the first difference operator and α i is a country dummy. The more negative beta in (5), the faster the convergence of the country will be towards the other European countries. So the concept of beta-convergence investigates how the dispersion of a cross-section of countries develops in terms of levels. A different concept of convergence investigates how the cross-sectional dispersion develops in terms of standard deviations or variances. When this dispersion decreases over time, we say there is sigmaconvergence. The concept of beta-convergence is more appropriate for our purpose than the concept of sigma-convergence since the ECB aims at keeping the level of inflation for the Euro Area as a whole below, but close to 2% in the medium term. Table 2 reports econometric evidence on the speed of the convergence of inflation expectations. The specification in Table 2 deviates in four respects from (5). First, the lagged changes in expected inflation were insignificant and therefore have been eliminated from the regression. Second, our regression includes the lagged log of OECD comparative price levels (log (cpl t-1,i ) ). This variable is included to account for possibly catching-up effects: inflation expectations may be higher in those countries where the price level is still low compared with other Eurozone countries (and vice versa). Third, our regressions include not only cross-sectional fixed effects but also period fixed effects. The use of period fixed effects has the same effect as taking all variables in deviation from the cross-sectional average. The interpretation of (5) The main findings are as follows. All regressions report significant convergence; the estimated beta-coefficient on lagged expected inflation is statistically significant in all three specifications. Our catching-up variable (log(cpl t-1,i )) is always insignificant.
The most interesting finding in Table 2 is the value and significance of the EMU interaction term (Επ τ−1,ι *D EMU ). The coefficient on the interaction term is insignificant in both the long sample and in the short sample including Greece. It has, however, the anticipated negative sign, according to which EMU membership would lead to a stronger convergence. These results imply that EMU has not led to a significantly stronger convergence in inflation expectations. The regression for the shorter sample period excluding Greece (see the second column of Table 2 ) yields a positive and significant coefficient for the interaction term, implying that the convergence in inflation expectations has become weaker since the start of EMU. Given the strong convergence of Greek expected inflation to that of other countries before 1999, this result is unsurprising. The coefficient on lagged expected inflation is also much larger here compared with the other two specifications. These estimates correspond to the visual impression from Figures 2 and 3: strong convergence in expected inflation in the run-up towards EMU combined with a relaxation in the process of convergence after 1999. Whether we include Greece or not, we can reject the hypothesis that the EMU interaction term is negative at a 10% significance level. We therefore conclude that EMU has not led to faster convergence in inflation expectations.
To account for possible heterogeneity in beta convergence between large and small EMU countries, For the purpose of comparison, Table 3 reports similar estimates for actual inflation convergence. It shows that the patterns across the three samples are very similar compared with Table 2 . The coefficients on lagged inflation are also close to those on lagged expected inflation. Thus, the regressions do not seem to support the notion of stronger convergence in inflation expectations as compared with actual inflation rates.
In order to check the robustness of our results to the quantification of the survey data, we finally tested for convergence using the qualitative balance scores, see equation
(1). Table 4 shows the beta coefficients to be negative and significantly different from zero. This estimate of the beta coefficient implies that an above-average balance score in the previous period leads to a below-average increase in the balance score in the next period. The EMU-interaction term is, however, insignificant in all three specifications, implying that EMU has not led to stronger convergence in balance scores to the Eurozone average. We can now summarize the conclusions on convergence as follows. The data show that significant beta-convergence has occurred in inflation rates, balance scores and constructed inflation expectations. There is, however, no evidence that EMU has accelerated the process of convergence. If anything, the data suggest that after strong convergence in the run-up to EMU, convergence has become weaker since. The estimates also do not support the hypothesis that the convergence in inflation expectations is more pronounced that the convergence in actual inflation rates. These findings support the evidence in Figure 3 , showing comparable dispersion in actual and expected inflation rates. Applied to the distinction between ex ante and ex post real interest rates, we are unable to corroborate the ECB's finding that, using
Consensus data, the dispersion in ex ante real rates is much lower than the dispersion in ex post rates. In contrast, the Consumer Survey data suggest a similar dispersion of ex ante and ex post real interest rates. A likely explanation for this result is that consumers' inflation expectations rather than professional economists' inflation expectations depend more on past inflation. 
Inflation uncertainty
The probability approach explained above also allows for the estimation of the standard deviation of the distribution of inflation expectations, see equation (3).
Below, this estimate will be used as our indication of inflation uncertainty. Before turning to the empirical findings, we first need, however, to clarify the concept of inflation uncertainty.
The empirical literature identifies two very different approaches in measuring inflation uncertainty or inflation volatility. The time-series approach utilizes (G)ARCH models to estimate the time-varying conditional volatility of inflation, see e.g. Engle (1982) . Basically, this approach tries to econometrically identify clusters of large or small inflation shocks in order to estimate the variance of inflation in the next period. In contrast, the cross-sectional approach uses information on (dis)agreement about the inflation outlook among different forecasters at one point in time to assess inflation uncertainty. Our measure of inflation uncertainty belongs to the latter approach. In general, the two approaches do not yield comparable results, see e.g.
Giordani and Söderlind (2003).
Apart from the distinction between the time-series and cross-sectional approaches, a further complication concerns the proper interpretation of inflation uncertainty in the Eurozone. In the Consumer Survey, the European Commission calculates aggregate replies to the questionnaires as weighted averages of the country-aggregate replies. It is not clear, however, whether the resulting Eurozone aggregate has a straightforward interpretation. It would assume that economic agents (consumers or investors) care about the inflation uncertainty regarding a European consumer price index, which is calculated as a weighted average of national price developments. If we maintain the more plausible assumption that economic agents consume locally, then the national consumer price indices may be better proxies for the price increase in their consumption basket. This perspective questions the relevance of analyzing inflation uncertainty at the Eurozone level using a aggregate consumer price index for the Eurozone. If investors and consumers still consume a local basket of goods, which is presumably better represented by the national consumer price index than by a European one, inflation uncertainty is still a national experience.
It therefore makes sense to look at the cross-sectional estimates of national inflation uncertainty, based on the probability approach outlined in Section 2. In Figure 4 Member States because of their smaller weight in the aggregate data. As a result, the ECB interest rates will react more strongly in setting interest rates to stabilize inflation in large countries compared to small countries. T maintained within the Eurozone. Using the same three sample periods as in subsection 3.1, Table 5 reports positive and significant regression coefficients for all three specifications. The interaction term (π i *D EMU ) shows that EMU has had little influence on this relationship, except for the sample including Greece. As the Greek data show high inflation and inflation uncertainty in the pre-EMU period, it is unsurprising that including Greece leads to a weakening of the link, as Greek inflation had to come down significantly after 1999 to qualify for EMU entry in 2001. Table 6 reports again the results of our robustness check. Using the proportions of extreme responses as a measure of price instability, two out of three regressions show a significant and positive link between inflation and the proportion of extreme responses. Table 7 shows the absence of a relationship between country size and national inflation uncertainty, measured by both the mean and standard deviation of σ π,t,i , before EMU. In contrast, for the EMU sample period the rank correlations are much higher and more significant. 
Short-term versus long-term inflation expectations
The findings reported above show that short-term inflation expectations based on the Consumer Survey data lack the convergence which is present in the short-term inflation expectations of Consensus Forecasts used by the ECB. Whereas the cross-sectional dispersion in ex ante real interest rates using the Consensus data is 30-35% lower than the dispersion using actual inflation rates (see Table 1 ), dispersion measured using the inflation expectations from the Consumer Survey roughly equals actual dispersion (see Figure 3) . As hypothesized above, this suggests that the professional economists of the Consensus Forecasts are more inclined to incorporate the implications of monetary union for the convergence in inflation rates than ordinary consumers responding to the Consumer Survey. Given the limited nature of the Consumer Survey, it is impossible to test whether the same conclusion holds for longer time horizons.
Conclusions
This paper has used the European Commission's Consumer Survey to examine 1) the dispersion in expected inflation rates across EMU Member States, 2) the convergence in expected inflation over time and 3) the developments in inflation uncertainty in EMU Member States. What can we conclude from the European Commission's Consumer Survey? Should the common monetary policy in EMU take into account the situation in individual countries? We conclude that, although significant betaconvergence has occurred in inflation rates, balance scores and constructed inflation expectations, there is no evidence that EMU has speeded up the process of convergence in inflation expectations. In contrast, the data suggest that after strong convergence in the run-up to EMU, convergence in expected inflation has become weaker since. Also, the convergence in inflation expectations is not more pronounced that the convergence in actual inflation rates. This contradicts the ECB's (2004) findings that dispersion in ex ante real interest rates is lower than that in ex post real interest rates.
Finally, our analysis of inflation uncertainty demonstrates that the widely accepted link between the level of inflation and the extent of inflation uncertainty still holds within EMU. In addition, we show that since the introduction of the Euro a new relationship has arisen between inflation uncertainty and country size. 
